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Introduction
The collapse of Iceland’s banking system
in October 2008 and subsequent currency cri-
sis has had serious consequences for the Ice-
landic economy and social welfare. As a wel-
fare state assuming primary responsibility for
the economic and social security of its citi-
zens, Iceland’s unemployment rate and level
of household debt depend on the effectiveness
of the welfare system. The provision of welfare
has, on average, accounted for 39 percent of
total government expenditures from 1998 to
2007; thus, that sector has suffered significantly
from budget deficits resulting from the crisis.
(Statistics Iceland) An analysis of welfare reform
in response to the financial collapse is rele-
vant in understanding the effects of the crisis
on Icelandic citizens. 
To understand the impact of the crisis on
the Icelandic welfare system, this study focuses
on three distinct periods in its development.
First, the welfare system’s characteristics prior
to the early 1990s provide a baseline for com-
parison. During the second period, until 2008,
changes in response to economic stagnation
in the 1990s provide context for understand-
ing recent reforms. Third, the study focuses
on analysis of developments in the welfare state
since the crisis in 2008.
The exposition explores changes across these
eras in four categories of social insurance: old
age protection (pension), health care insurance,
unemployment security, and provisions for fam-
ily care. This study argues that although the
welfare system developed based on socio-dem-
ocratic principles, the right-of-center govern-
ment’s response to the 1990s stagnation was a
decisive policy shift toward a liberal welfare
model. Rather than continuing in a liberal direc-
tion after the financial crisis in 2008, the first
two-party left-wing government in Iceland’s his-
tory returned to a socio-democratic welfare
model.  
The State of Welfare Policy in Iceland
in the Mid 1990s 
Prior to the early 1990s, the foundation of the
Icelandic welfare state was largely the Scandi-
navian (social democratic) welfare model. The
Scandinavian model holds the state, rather than
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markets or family, directly responsible for the
provision of social services. Premised on the
combination of substantial income redistribu-
tion and state employment, labor market poli-
cies, which promote full employment and equi-
table distribution of wealth, supplement an
extensive social insurance system that is the cor-
nerstone of the Nordic welfare state. (Esping-
Andersen, pp. 27-28)
While the Scandinavian welfare model
provides a basis for understanding the general
character of the Icelandic system, Iceland’s
approach deviates from the traditional model.
For example, prior to the mid 1990s, the pen-
sion system consisted of two components: the
basic public pension and the occupational
pension fund. The public pension was a set
flat amount divided into a basic pension and
an income supplement. Initially, the public pen-
sion was linked to the average pay of manual
workers whereas the income supplement was
heavily based on income testing. (Gudmunds-
son, 2001, p. 2) However, following 1992 leg-
islation, the public pension benefits became sub-
ject to income testing as well, resulting in
reductions for almost half of all pensioners. The
income testing produced a disparity between
public pension benefits and market wages. Pub-
lic pensions fell to 77 percent of the average
income of male workers in 1990. (Ólafsson,
2001, p. 16) The income testing and the close
ties between personal earnings in the market
and the receipt of social benefits indicated a
divergence from the welfare state from the
Scandinavian model. 
However, the social democratic roots
remained tangible in the nearly universal cov-
erage afforded by the occupational pension
funds, implemented in 1970 to supplement
the public social security system. Participa-
tion was compulsory both for wage earners
and the self-employed, with contributions based
on total earnings. (Gundmundsson, 2001) The
establishment of the occupational pension
funds, which were fully funded, reduced the role
of the basic public pension to poverty preven-
tion. A third tier was added in the early 1990s in
the form of a private system of voluntary indi-
vidual pension accounts, further reducing the
state’s role. 
The pension system also diverged from its
Scandinavian roots in its relatively low gov-
ernment expenditure. Figure 1 compares Ice-
land’s government expenditure on old age
pension benefits to the average in Nordic coun-
tries. Public spending is lower due to higher
shares of occupational and private pensions and
extensive income testing coupled with high
employment participation rates for individuals
65 and older. (Gudmundsson, 2010, p. 2) Nev-
ertheless, public pensions remained the largest
component between 1991 and 1995, despite
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Figure 1
Average Government Expenditure on Welfare Benefits 1990-1995
(Percent of GDP)
increased privatization and means testing, con-
tributing an average of 2.6 percent of GDP
toward benefits compared to 1.7 percent by
occupational pensions. (Ólafsson, 2005, p.
226)
In contrast, the health care system has
been the component of the welfare state most
representative of the social democratic model,
providing universal and comprehensive access
to mental, physical, and social health services.
It began to take its current form in the late
1980s and early 1990s, influenced by a more
general trend toward centralization. Prior to
1991, municipalities retained considerable
responsibility for financing and administering
health services. The health care system was cen-
tralized in 1991 through the Local Authorities
Social Service Act, which transferred full finan-
cial responsibility of health care centers and
municipal hospitals to the state. (Halldorsson,
p. 21) 
The public sector dominated health care
provision through the early 1990s. Between
1985 and 1990, the public share averaged 86.8
percent of total health care expenditures. (Hall-
dorsson, p. 33) The remaining portion not tax
financed was almost entirely direct household
co-payments for specialist consultations, outpa-
tient operations, dental care, and pharmaceu-
ticals. (Ólafsson, 2003) Unlike other welfare pro-
visions in Iceland at that time, the health care
system was comparable to those of other Scan-
dinavian countries in terms of resources and
public expenditure (as illustrated in Figure 1). 
Another primary responsibility of the
state was the provision of unemployment ben-
efits and public employment. Full employ-
ment is both a guarantee and a requirement for
the functioning of a social democratic welfare
system. However, because Iceland historically
has had unusually high levels of employment,
unemployment benefits held less social and
political significance than other welfare provi-
sions. The average unemployment rate between
1985 and 1992 was only 1.1 percent for men and
1.7 percent for women. (DataMarket) Conse-
quently, the average annual expenditure on
unemployment benefits during the same time
period was only 0.23 percent of GDP. (Data-
Market) The state also influenced the labor mar-
ket through its role as employer, accounting for
34.1 percent of total employment in 1994.
(OECD, p. 84) Although the low unemployment
benefits represent a unique character of the Ice-
landic system, the high rates of employment,
public employment, and female participation in
the workforce demonstrate the inherent influ-
ence of the Scandinavian model.
Provisions for family care during the
late 1980s and early 1990s were also less gen-
erous than other Nordic countries but nonethe-
less founded on the Scandinavian model. Provi-
sions made child benefits tax deductible, with
subsidies issued if the benefit amount exceeded
taxes otherwise owed. Despite a gradual increase
beginning in 1984, the proportion of child
benefits that was income tested remained fairly
low, representing only 24 percent of total ben-
efits between 1988 and 1990. (Eydal, pg. 15)
Nevertheless, the total expenditure on child ben-
efits was high compared with other Nordic
countries, peaking in 1991 at 1.2 percent of
GDP. (Eydal, p. 17) 
Childcare provisions are another major
component of family policy. In 1992, the Social
Services Law established family daycare provi-
sions under the Ministry of Social Affairs,
emphasizing academic objectives in connection
with the education system. (Eydal, p. 4) How-
ever, despite working parents’ needs, few day-
care facilities were available, with only 178 pub-
lic childcare institutions in operation by 1994.
(Eydal, p. 20) As a result, full-time daycare
programs were only offered to a small number
of children, primarily of single parents, who
were privileged in the system with regard to
both access and fees. On the other hand, univer-
sal rights have been afforded to all citizens for
paid parental leave. In 1987, the Law on Parental
Leave entitled all women to six months of paid
maternity leave, transferable to the father 30
days after the birth. (Ólafsson, 2003, p. 403)
Thus, family policy upholds major tenets of
the Scandinavian model, at the same time, with-
out guaranteed access to daycare, maintaining
a uniquely Icelandic character.
The deviation can be largely attributed
to the predominance of right-of-center politics.
(Ólafsson, 2005, p. 224) The Independence
Party, the leading party in government for the
majority of the postwar period, has been prima-
rily concerned with maintaining low taxes,
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restraining the role of government, and promot-
ing private solutions and individual self-help.
(Jonsson, p. 196) Despite the divergence, the
general characteristics and fundamental princi-
ples of Iceland’s welfare system remained pre-
dominantly socio-democratic. 
Transformation of the Icelandic 
Welfare System 
In the mid 1990s, however, the Icelandic
welfare system shifted firmly in the liberal direc-
tion.  The liberal welfare model distributes ben-
efits based on need, reduces the role of the state
in the provision of benefits and social protec-
tion, and employs a market-oriented approach
to primary care. Table 1 compares the two mod-
els with the defining characteristics of the Ice-
landic welfare system as of 1999. The liberal
transformation is manifest in increased income
testing of benefits, growing private and third
sector provision of social services, and reduced
role of publicly funded social security.                    
Private sector occupational pension
funds, initially supplements to the basic pen-
sion, replaced public pensions in providing
the majority of benefits after the mid 1990s.
Consequently, the role of social security in basic
income maintenance was significantly reduced.
(Ólafsson, 2005, p. 227) Between 1991 and 2001,
occupational pensions increased annually while
basic pensions remained relatively stable. From
1991 to 1995, public pensions averaged 2.6 per-
cent of GDP compared with 1.8 percent for
occupational pensions. (Ólafsson, 2005, p.
226) In 2001, basic public pensions remained at
2.6 percent of GDP while occupational pensions
had increased to 3 percent. (Ólafsson, 2005, p.
226) The growing private share adversely
affected the universal provision of pension ben-
efits by inversely linking benefits to previous
earnings. Had this trend continued, the public
role would “gradually be reduced to providing
primarily for the poor and those who cannot
lead their life with full participation in the labor
market.” (Ólafsson, 2005, p. 227) Table 2 shows
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Table 1
Contemporary Characteristics of the Icelandic Welfare Regime:
A Comparison Between the Liberal, Scandinavian, and Icelandic Welfare Models
the gradual decrease in public sector old age
pensions after 1995 and the increase in pri-
vate occupational pensions beginning in 1990.
The reduction in public expenditure is prima-
rily a result of partial income testing. Table 3
illustrates the increase in the means tested pen-
sion benefits from zero between 1990 and 1995
to 21.8 percent between 1996 and 2007. (Data-
Market) The increase correlates with a decrease
in the government share relative to private
sector funds.  
The shift was further facilitated by tax
incentives beginning in 1998 on voluntary
private pension savings. Employees could
deduct funds for individual pension schemes up
to a ceiling authorized by the Ministry of
Finance. The legislation stimulated a rapid
increase in voluntary private pensions, which
became the third pillar of the Icelandic sys-
tem, reaching 10 percent of GDP in 2002 and 15
percent by 2007. (Gudmundsson, 2001, p. 2) 
In addition to its departure from the
socio-democratic principle of universalism, the
liberal transformation was defined by a signifi-
cant reduction in benefits. In 1995 the gov-
ernment tied social security benefits to prices
rather than average wages as they had been in
the past. (Ólafsson, 2003, p. 403) The altered
protocol caused public pensioners to lag behind
labor market pay. In 1993 public social secu-
rity was almost 80 percent of “the lowest bar-
gained pay in the labour market [but] by 2001
this proportion was down to about 58 per-
cent.” (Ólafsson, 2003, p. 404) At the same time
tax policy reform reduced the personal tax
allowance and disproportionately increased
the tax burden on lower-income earners, the
majority of whom were old age pensioners.
(Ólafsson, 2010, p. 9)
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Table 2
Public-Private Pension Characteristics: Iceland 1990-1997 (Percent of GDP)
Source: Ólafsson, Stefán. “The Icelandic Pension System ...”
Table 3
Welfare Benefits Expenditures and Means Tested Rates
The health care system was similarly
affected by the evolution. Increasingly liberal
characteristics emerged despite an overall trend
toward increased government expenditure on
health services as a percent of GDP. Government
expenditure on health care was 6.7 percent of
GDP in 1991 but by 2002 reached 8.3 percent.
(Ólafsson, 2003, p. 404) However, because
total expenditure on health care increased at a
greater rate than government funding for health
care, private funding increased disproportion-
ately. In 1990, only 13.4 percent of health care
services was funded by private out of pocket
costs. In response to the increased use of income
testing of welfare benefits, by 2001 17.1 percent
was financed privately. (Halldorsson, p. 25)
Unemployment benefits were similarly
significantly reduced by two changes. First,
the standards for indexing changed in 1997 so
that the flat rate unemployment benefit grows
with price increases rather than wage changes
in the fish processing industry. (Ólafsson, 2003,
p. 403) This change has increased the gap
between the flat rate unemployment benefit and
the minimum wage. The unemployment ben-
efit in 2003 was 77,000 Icelandic krónur (ISK)
per month. It would have been 97,000 ISK
had the indexing change not been implemented.
(Ólafsson, 2003, p. 402) By comparison, the
same year the average monthly salary of the
working class was 240,000 ISK. (Ólafsson, 2005,
p. 228) Moreover, the change also resulted in
a flat rate unemployment benefit below the
poverty line. Not surprisingly, the percent of the
population below the standard poverty line
has reflected unemployment levels.
A second change was that unemploy-
ment benefits were subject to greater income
testing after the mid 1990s. As shown in Table
3, between 1990 and 1995, 9.9 percent of unem-
ployment benefits were means tested, increas-
ing to 18.36 percent between 1996 and 2007.
(DataMarket) In short, the erosion of univer-
sal unemployment benefits was consistent with
the other increasingly liberal characteristics
of the welfare system after 1995.
Family care was, to an extent, an excep-
tion to the liberal transformation. Due to the
demands that the high rates of female partici-
pation in the workforce placed on the public
provision of childcare, the income tested share
of child benefits actually fell by nearly half
between 1995 and 2007 from 50.8 percent to
25.7 percent. During the same period, daycare
services expanded to provide universal access to
children over age three and fathers gained the
right to take up to six months of parental
leave. (Ólafsson, 2003, p. 402) These significant
family care policy gains notwithstanding, the
income testing after 1995 remained a significant
fraction of total benefits, more representative of
a liberal model. 
The liberal transformation of the welfare
system throughout the mid 1990s and early
2000s coincided with a general policy trend
toward privatization, freer market economics,
and financial liberalization, aiming to improve
competitiveness and economic development
in response to economic stagnation in the early
1990s. (Ólafsson, 2010, p. 23) Under the Inde-
pendence Party, user fees for services increased
as did income testing for benefits. (Ólafsson,
2001, p. 17) Free market policies privatized
state-owned industries and significantly reduced
the role of the public sector. Although the
market-oriented reforms contributed to low
unemployment, steadily increasing real income,
and an average annual GDP growth rate of 4.3
percent between 1995 and 2005, these devel-
opments were achieved at the expense of the
socio-democratic character of the welfare sys-
tem. (Statistics Iceland) The negative effects
were somewhat mitigated by the positive eco-
nomic trends, which made the need for public
welfare nearly obsolete—that is, until the finan-
cial collapse in 2008.
Effects of the Economic Crisis on the
Icelandic Welfare System
The economic crisis and financial collapse in
2008 significantly increased demands on wel-
fare programs while concurrently restraining
government expenditure, necessitating a revi-
sion of the system. The current government is
the “first two-party leftwing government in
the history of the Icelandic republic, and its for-
mation is one of the political consequences of
the financial collapse, which was widely per-
ceived as being caused by the policies of the for-
mer, more neoliberal governments of the Inde-
pendence Party and the Progressive Party.”
(Ólafsson, 2010, p. 30) Rather than imple-
menting extensive welfare cuts, the coalition
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government between the Social Democratic
Alliance and the Left-Green Party has empha-
sized “the importance of using social protection
and the welfare state to cushion the conse-
quences of the crisis.” (Ólafsson, 2010, p. 30)
The shift in political leadership explains why the
welfare-oriented response to the current finan-
cial crisis differs from the market-oriented
response to the 1990s stagnation. (Ólafsson,
2001, p. 17; Ólafsson, 2010, p. 30) Changes have
primarily focused on expanding the public
sector, revising the benefits system, and
strengthening the infrastructure of the wel-
fare system (i.e. shifts back toward the socio-
democratic model). 
Extensive reform initiatives expanded
the basic public pension to compensate for
the reduction in occupational pension funds, the
part of the system most affected by the financial
crisis. By 2009, occupational pension funds suf-
fered close to 30 percent reduction of their
assets, forcing payments to be cut by up to 10
percent. (Ólafsson, 2009, p. 25) Consequently,
public social security will be expanded to replace
up to 40 percent of the cuts (Ólafsson, 2009, p.
25), restoring a greater degree of universalism. 
To assist lower-income citizens, the
minimum guarantee for pensioners was
increased by 20 percent in 2009. (Ólafsson,
2009, p. 3) The minimum guarantee provides
a supplement to those with limited earnings
from pension funds, benefiting close to 25
percent of old age and disability pensioners since
its implementation. (Ólafsson, 2009, p. 4) In
addition, an increase in personal allowances for
employment, occupational, and financial earn-
ings has facilitated a more equitable distribu-
tion of income. The minimum earnings subject
to income testing have also increased. (Ólafs-
son, 2009, p. 3) Moreover, the general provision
of social security was also expanded by 9.6
percent in January of 2009. (Ólafsson, 2009, p.
25) Child benefits have improved, as have age-
related supplements for disability pensioners
and allowances for pensioners institutional-
ized in care wards. (Ólafsson, 2009, p. 10) 
Long-term reform initiatives, recom-
mended to the Federation of Old Age Pension-
ers by an appointed task force, will provide the
basis for a streamlined social security system
that will replace the current system. The
reforms aim at simplifying the benefit structure
“from three benefit types and two supplements
to one benefit type and one supplement in the
form of a minimum guarantee.” (Ólafsson, 2009,
p. 10) Old age pensioners would receive a per-
sonal allowance of 30,000 krónur per month,
exempt from the income-testing formula, on
earnings from occupational pension funds.
The free income bracket, which will be extended
even further in the long run, will be initially
financed through more extensive income test-
ing for pensioners with higher than average
pension earnings. (Ólafsson, 2009, p. 10) The
intended reform will reestablish a more gen-
erous and universal social security, again more
socio-democratic in character.  
Since 2007, the provision of health care
has been guided by legislation with the follow-
ing aim: “All citizens should have available to
them, the greatest quality health care services
that is possible to provide them with at any
given time, to protect their psychological, phys-
ical and social health.” (Asgeirsdottir, p. 317)
Pursuing this goal, despite restraints in expen-
ditures necessitated by the IMF restoration pro-
gram, the government has made health care
reorganization a priority for improving eco-
nomic efficiency. In the opinion of the OECD,
“the Icelandic health care system delivers very
high quality service levels by international stan-
dards, [but] in some cases does so at excessively
high costs, thus lacking in efficiency and incen-
tives for using less costly available means.”
(Ólafsson, 2010, p. 18)
Measures to reduce inefficiency include
cost benefit assessments and increasing the gov-
ernment’s role as a purchaser of health services.
The public institution Icelandic Health Insur-
ance was founded to administer and purchase
health care services on behalf of the govern-
ment. As the only purchaser of health serv-
ices, the institution separates the purchaser
from the provider to increase efficiency and pro-
mote competition among providers. (Asgeirs-
dottir, p. 322) Icelandic Health Insurance is
responsible for monitoring the delivery and
quality of health care services, taking into
consideration economic efficiency and equal
access. (Asgeirsdottir, p. 322) 
The reorganization will continue with
the aim of reducing the overall cost of serv-
ices while maintaining the quality, security, and
volume of care. In 2009, seven health care insti-
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tutions in the Western Health Region were
merged. (Ólafsson, 2010, p. 24) A Ministry of
Health task force report in December 2009 out-
lined further consolidation plans. Recommen-
dations include reducing the number of surgery
units and merging facilities for risky birth serv-
ices. (Ólafsson, 2010, p. 24) Additionally, outpa-
tient services will increase in order to minimize
the use of inpatient services in the more expen-
sive hospitals. Although reorganization
increases pressure on staff at various levels, it
has helped to preserve the high standard of
health care despite extensive expenditure cuts. 
Unemployment is the welfare sector
most affected by the financial crisis. The unem-
ployment rate, which was 2.3 percent in 2007,
increased to 7.2 percent in 2009 and 7.6 percent
in 2010. (Ministry of Economic Affairs, p. 85)
According to Finance Minister Steingrimur J.
Sigfusson, rising unemployment has dispropor-
tionately affected private employees. At least
nine out of every ten jobs lost have been in
the private sector. (“Icelandic Public...," p. 1)
In fact, the number of public sector jobs actu-
ally increased by 300 between 2008 and 2009.
(“Icelandic Public...," p. 1) To combat unemploy-
ment, the government intends to create another
6,000 jobs, one-third of the unemployment
count in 2010. (Ólafsson, 2009, p. 27) 
The government has also responded to
rising unemployment by increasing unem-
ployment compensation and expanding unem-
ployment benefits. First in 2009, benefits
increased by close to ten percent. (Ólafsson,
2009, p. 26) Then, in 2010, a temporary meas-
ure extended the right to unemployment com-
pensation from three years to four. (Ministry
of Economic Affairs, p. 87) As a result, social
security and social welfare expenses rose
sharply, by 28 percent. (Ministry of Economic
Affairs, p. 66) 
In order to ensure that individuals bene-
fiting from unemployment compensation
remain active job seekers, the Directorate of
Labor offers job market–related and
study–related remedies. Job seekers with a study
agreement receive unemployment compensa-
tion when pursuing job-related studies. Simi-
larly, job market remedies compensate a com-
pany or institution hiring a job seeker for
vocational training, trial employment, or job
rehabilitation. The company directly receives
the individual’s base unemployment compensa-
tion, in addition to an eight percent matching
contribution to a pension fund. (Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, p. 88) Additional remedies have
also been implemented such as employment for
up to six months in business development
programs, agreements that provide employment
opportunities in entrepreneurial companies, and
temporary intensive projects or volunteer
opportunities for job seekers. (Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, p. 88) Taken together, these
extensions confirm the role of the state in
unemployment insurance. 
Family care policy has, comparatively, been
minimally affected by the financial crisis. How-
ever, there have been some changes to generous
parental leave policy. The ceiling on parental
leave payments was lowered in July 2009 from
400,000 ISK to 350,000 ISK, and then further
decreased to 300,000 ISK in December 2009.
(Einarsdottir, p. 3) To compensate, the allowable
timeframe for parental leave was extended from
18 months to 36 months. Additionally, payments
have been increased to 80 percent of earnings
for earnings lower than 200,000 ISK and 75 per-
cent of earnings over 200,000 ISK. (Einarsdot-
tir, p. 3) Thus policies on family care have
retained their socio-democratic character
despite cuts in government expenditures neces-
sitated by the economic crisis. 
Conclusions
The Icelandic welfare system has been
affected by both the economic situation and the
political orientation of the governing party.
Prior to the mid 1990s, despite its socio-dem-
ocratic foundations, the welfare system was
“smaller, less costly, less generous, and less
redistributive than other Scandinavian welfare
systems,” (Ólafsson, 2005, p. 214) spending
approximately one-third less on welfare bene-
fits in proportion to GDP than the Nordic aver-
age. (DataMarket) The divergence from the
Scandinavian welfare model can be largely
attributed to the predominance of right-of-cen-
ter politics in Iceland. Nevertheless, the welfare
system was, and is still predominantly, defined
by the general characteristics and fundamen-
tal socio-democratic principles. 
That said, between the mid 1990s and early
2000s, the system experienced an unprece-
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dented shift in the liberal direction. The trans-
formation coincided with a more general free
market–oriented policy approach aimed at
reversing the stagnation of the early 1990s.
(Ólafsson, 2010, p. 23) Under the leadership of
the right-of-center Independence Party, the wel-
fare state became largely need-based between
1995 and 2007 rather than providing univer-
sal social and economic protection. The nega-
tive implications for economic security, how-
ever, were mitigated by very high employment
and the general increase in household wealth,
which enabled individuals to finance health
care, pension, unemployment, and family care
benefits to supplement public provisions.
Welfare demand rose significantly in the
fallout from the financial collapse; at the same
time government revenues suffered. Under
the leadership of the first two-party left-wing
government in the history of the Icelandic
republic, social protection has been re-empha-
sized, as a means of mitigating the conse-
quences of the financial crisis. This approach
countervails measures implemented by the pre-
vious Independence Party–led government,
which reduced welfare benefits and emphasized
the negative effects of tax increases on economic
growth. In contrast, the current coalition gov-
ernment between the Social Democratic
Alliance and the Left-Green Party has “tried to
protect the welfare state as much as possible and
to shelter the lower income groups against con-
sequences of the crisis.” (Ólafsson, 2010, p.
30) Consequently, changes and proposals for
further reform have primarily focused on
expanding the public sector, revising the ben-
efits system, and strengthening the socio-
democratic infrastructure of the welfare system. 
The resulting sharply increased govern-
ment expenditure on welfare benefits has been
accompanied by an expansion in the proportion
not means tested (i.e. universal). The increase
has been financed largely through systemic
reform, which has streamlined administration
and reduced overall costs. Between 1995 and
2007, the average government expenditure on
administration was 2,351 million ISK. In 2008,
the costs fell to 2,180 million ISK and should
continue to decrease over the next few years
as the reforms take effect. (DataMarket) 
Through reorganization, prioritization,
and increased efficiency, the government has
been successful thus far in maintaining Iceland’s
standard of welfare despite cuts. However, the
need for more significant cuts presents a con-
tinued challenge. Regardless of the uncertain
future for an Icelandic welfare system in transi-
tion, its socio-democratic foundations have been
critical in mitigating the initial effects of the
economic crisis on the welfare of the Icelandic
people.
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